1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
3	SOUTHERN DIVISION
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5	Civ. 11-4121
6	ARGUS LEADER MEDIA, dba ARGUS LEADER,
7	Plaintiff,
8	-vs- CLOSING STATEMENTS
9	
10	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
11	Defendant.
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13	
14	U.S. District Courthouse Sioux Falls, SD
15	May 25, 2016 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
16	COURT TRIAL
17	TRANSCRIPT OF CLOSING STATEMENTS
18	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
19	U.S. District Court Judge Sioux Falls, SD
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21	APPEARANCES:
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MAY 25, 2016 1 2 (In open court, counsel present, at 3:15 p.m.) THE COURT: Mr. Gaston, are you ready to 3 4 proceed? 5 MR. GASTON: I'm ready. Good afternoon. would like to thank the Court and counsel for allowing 6 7 me a moment to make a closing argument on behalf of the United States Government. 8 9 Over the last two days we have touched on many issues, but at the core of this trial is a fundamental 10 11 legal question. Does the information requested by the 12 Argus meet the legal standard for withholding under 13 Exemption 4 of the FOIA? The testimony over the last 14 two days offers a clear answer. Yes. 15 Exemption 4 of the FOIA asks three things. 16 First, is it commercial or financial information? Plaintiff has stipulated to this already. 17 18 Second, that it was received from a person, as 19 defined by law. Even using a simplified understanding 20 of how the USDA records and keeps SNAP redemption 2.1 data, the requested information from the Argus, one 22 can reasonably conclude this information originates 23 from the retailers, and not the Government. 24 The third question, is this information 25 confidential? Just last year in the Madel decision,

the Eighth Circuit confirmed that a record must be 1 2 withheld as confidential where release of that record may cause substantial competitive harm. 3 In fact, the Madel decision found substantial 4 5 competitive harm in a release of submitter data that 6 would reveal, and I listed three, and I quote, "Market 7 shares, inventory levels, and sales trends." THE COURT: So you are only arguing that 8 9 it's confidential, not that it's privileged? 10 MR. GASTON: I'm arguing that it is 11 privileged, and I'm arguing that it's -- oh, I see 12 what you're asking. I'm focusing my argument on the 13 confidential based on the substantial competitive 14 harm. It's privileged and confidential, I've put 15 together as substantial competitive harm, based on the 16 cases. 17 THE COURT: But what I'm trying to do is 18 narrow it. Are you only arguing that it's 19 confidential? 20 MR. GASTON: Your Honor, may I take a moment 21 to look at the case law to confirm the component that 22 I'm -- I do not want to abandon one component while 23 arguing the other. 24 THE COURT: Sure. 25 MR. GASTON: Thank you. Your Honor, that is correct. We have never argued the privilege.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. GASTON: I would refer back to the Madel decision. The Madel decision found substantial competitive harm, as I mentioned, in market shares, inventory levels, and sales trends.

THE COURT: So many of the cases that I looked at dealing with whether it was confidential dealt with information that the Government had gotten from one party, and whether the release of that information would then impact them, because all of their competitors would have that information about that one party.

I didn't see any cases where it was release of information from everybody similarly situated.

MR. GASTON: Your Honor, I would argue the Madel decision, even though it only included four particular parties, involved one hundred percent of those parties, and as those parties responded, the case looked at a declaration from a DEA official who considered that information as a statement that they made to the Court.

So, in fact, what's interesting about the Madel decision, the affidavits did not come -- excuse me. The declaration did not come from the retailers,

but from a Government official herself. 1 2 What I would like to do to distinguish the cases that you reference is I looked first to the 3 Eighth Circuit, and I looked towards other cases in 4 the D.C. Circuit and others. 5 I would say that each individual retailer who 6 7 has submitted data, all of them should be considered as individuals, and that competition should be 8 considered as competition that surrounds those 9 individual retailers in each particular instance. 10 11 I don't think grouping them together 12 eliminates the individual competitive harm that each 13 retailer who has submitted information might receive. 14 THE COURT: So let's talk about some other 15 Government programs. For instance, the Department of Ag pays 16 benefits to individual farmers that are here in 17 18 South Dakota. 19 MR. GASTON: Yes. 20 THE COURT: And that information is public. MR. GASTON: Your Honor, to my knowledge, 21 22 not all of that information is public. 23 In fact, under the most recent Farm Bill, and

I believe the one before it, a class of information

which is known as GIS information, geospatial

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satellite type information, is explicitly removed from that, because, based on a Department of Agriculture decision, that when that information went out, it was competitively harmful.

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THE COURT: But I know information has been published in the Argus Leader that listed, for instance, the top 20 people, producers in South Dakota, and how much they received in ag subsidies.

MR. GASTON: Right. But those subsidies -THE COURT: And wouldn't that cause some
competitive harm to them as compared to other
producers?

MR. GASTON: I am not an expert on the farm subsidies, the nature of the subsidies that those farms have received. And I am not an expert on what those subsidies might have done to the competitive nature or position of those farms.

What I am an expert on is what the information requested by the Argus does, in terms of the competitive nature of that information, in the complete absence of that information in the marketplace by those affected retailers of the information requested.

So while I cannot create why I'm not

sufficiently informed of the case to which you refer, to the information to which you refer, to create a one-for-one comparison, I can say that a competitive harm element in this particular set of information in this particular matter is clear.

THE COURT: So another area I was thinking about are physicians and medical providers, and they get Medicare and Medicaid proceeds. I believe that that information is publicly available.

MR. GASTON: Your Honor, I believe I may disagree with you. I believe there was case law on that particular topic, where there was a ruling that went one way, and then it was reversed. I don't have those cases in front of me, so I cannot confirm it.

But my understanding is that a Medicare case went the other way, and that Medicare information, sorted by physician, is not available.

I can state from my experience. I have physicians in my family, and they were concerned about this issue.

So when this issue actually did not end up coming out, as you described, it was viewed as a relief, because this information they, too, viewed as confidential. I believe the case you cite is from Florida.

THE COURT: Well, actually what I'm citing is an article that I read in USA TODAY a number of years ago that identified the top 10 people or top 10 entities that received Medicaid or Medicare payments and the dollar amounts that they had received.

MR. GASTON: Also worth exploring is what exemption that information was held under. For instance, if it was a larger entity, and they were using Exemption 6, rather than Exemption 4, then what you would have in the case would be a situation where the Medicare redemptions would perhaps reveal too much of those individual doctors' information. Right? Rather than what we are talking about here with Exemption 4.

So without the case in front of me and without being fully versed in the exact nature of the case you described --

THE COURT: I'm telling you it's not a case.

It's a newspaper article that I read that listed the names of the providers and the amounts that they received.

MR. GASTON: Right. I guess the case that supported the release of the information coming out, as you describe. So I understand the outcome you put forth before me.

However, I do not understand the genesis of that information, nor do I understand exactly where that information flows, and those doctors are entities as you describe commerce. Perhaps a hospital has a different sort of argument against the release of information than an individual physician.

So you said the top 20 entities. I did not read that article, Your Honor, so I do not know exactly to which you discuss.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GASTON: Now, while Exemption 4 is expressive on the must be withheld, it is silent on how an agency might reach this decision.

All that is required, as affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, is that an agency provides affidavits that state with specificity the justification for that decision.

The Madel Court found that an agency, if sufficiently informed, can even support this determination on their own.

An agency is not charged with the task of soliciting a majority, a plurality, or even an informed minority, though I argue the USDA has achieved all three.

The task is for the USDA to support the

decision to withhold, not on generalized allegations, 1 2 but with specific information and without bad faith. If the USDA has met this standard, I believe that this 3 matter can be resolved. 4 5 I believe the USDA has met this standard. Exemption 4 is also silent on the public 6 7 policy objective an agency must engage. Significant competitive harm is a question of facts and figures, 8 9 data and analysis. Withholding decisions by the USDA 10 are based on these factors. Policy, Your Honor, is 11 not part of this process. 12 Your Honor, the defense has offered compelling 13 narratives from a diverse slate of knowledgeable 14 stakeholders who understand their business and their 15 competition. THE COURT: So prior to this case, has USDA 16 17 ever argued that Exemption 4 precluded the release of 18 this type of information? 19 MR. GASTON: Are we referring to SNAP 20 redemption data 2005 to 2010? 2.1 THE COURT: Yes. That's the issue before 22 Or for any time period. I didn't mean to limit 23 it to this time period.

MR. GASTON: The understanding was that

under U.S.C. 2 -- I'm sorry, the statute escapes me.

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Under the statute, the information was not 1 2 allowed for release, and the belief was also and as promulgated through our own regulations. 3 7 C.F.R. 278.1(q), I believe, is information was not 4 5 allowed to be released. It was only after the decision by the Eighth 6 7 Circuit in the Argus Leader Media case in 2000, January 14, I believe that's correct, Your Honor, that 8 we had to begin to start looking at this matter in a 9 10 different light. 11 We have been understanding that Exemption 3 12 and the law, both 278.1 and 278.1(q), 7 C.F.R. 13 278.1(q), were the statutes and the regulations that 14 sufficiently were being used to keep this information. 15 This is notable, Your Honor, because it was 16 not until a few years ago that the Court and Congress made clear that a statute was -- a withholding statute 17 18 had to sort of have preamble language within the 19 statute itself. 20 The law that we were using had not been -- it

The law that we were using had not been -- it was an old law and had not had that sort of charge language at the beginning of it. So we didn't have the certainty that a statute, if rewritten today, might have.

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THE COURT: So this is the first time

that --

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MR. GASTON: This is the absolute first time that we've looked at this information under Exemption 4 of the FOIA, because we had felt confident that, until recently, that this information was properly withheld under Exemption 3 of the FOIA.

THE COURT: So no other Court has considered the argument that you are making here today with regard to this?

MR. GASTON: With regard to this particular data, under this particular exemption, I do not believe that a Court has made.

Now, I believe that parallel decisions have been made. As you mentioned, the Medicare case, I would like to take a look before I make that assertion directly in Court.

But in terms of SNAP retailer redemption data, no, I do not believe so. Though I will say that there has been protection put forth, for instance, for others towards their information.

For instance, if the Argus sought the information on an individual's SNAP redemptions. I use "redemptions" in a careful way here, because I understand it's had different shapes throughout the course of this case. That would not be allowed out

the door. But there would be different sorts of 1 2 redemptions. The only reason I raise that is because this 3 information is understood to have some metrics, some 4 5 nexus of protection in any form it's had. A lot has been kept at the USDA. 6 7 THE COURT: So other than Medicare data, is there any other general group of data that would be 8 9 similar to the SNAP benefits or Medicare payments? 10 MR. GASTON: May I have a moment to confer 11 with counsel? 12 THE COURT: Sure. 13 (Off the record discussion) MR. GASTON: After conferring with counsel, 14 15 I cannot confirm the response to your question, though I am willing to look it up, and I can offer an answer. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay. MR. GASTON: I'm sorry. Could you remind me 18 19 of the question so I made sure that I answered fully? 20 THE COURT: Well, I'm just wondering if 21 there are any other, rather than an individual who is 22 trying to keep information private, if there are 23 groups of people who are all receiving a Government 24 payment; so physicians that are providing Medicare 25 benefits; grocery stores that are getting SNAP

benefits; you know, entire classes of people that are getting some type of Federal payment.

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MR. GASTON: Yes. I don't know that I've seen a distinguishment of an individual and a group, especially when that group is construed of significantly independent individuals.

Even though there are trade associations and other sort of groupings, these are individual retailers who compete against each other, even within a trade association, even within an organization or a group.

Each one competes against Walmart. Each one competes against their neighbor. Each one competes against, you know, any retailer that we've seen come before the Court.

THE COURT: And I understand that you may lump them all together. But I'm trying to find out if there are other large groups of people that together are claiming that it's confidential information.

MR. GASTON: Under Exemption 4.

THE COURT: Under Exemption 4.

MR. GASTON: Again, Exemption 4 is, I think, a new approach for this protecting this information from disclosure, because we had the longstanding understanding that Exemption 3 would be the

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       appropriate way to withhold it.
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                 THE COURT: And I'm looking for --
                 MR. GASTON: Not to say that Exemption 4 is
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       inappropriate. I'm only saying that it was sort of
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       the first pass that the statute made clear,
       Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: Right. And I'm trying to see if
       there are other groups, like physicians getting
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      Medicare benefits.
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                 MR. GASTON: I can look into this,
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       Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: Okay.
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                 MR. GASTON: I believe that we cited one of
       those cases in our brief, but I just don't have them.
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       I'm just not prepared on that particular issue.
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                 THE COURT:
                             Okay.
                 MR. GASTON: Yes. So the defense has
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       offered compelling narrative from a diverse slate of
      knowledgeable stakeholders who understand their
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      business and their competition. All have made clear
       the nature of the confidential business information
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       the Argus asked the USDA to provide.
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               The Eighth Circuit has found that the FOIA
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       prevents disclosure when disclosure is likely.
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       "Likely," Your Honor, is the standard the
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Eighth Circuit uses to cause competitive harm. 1 2 Through testimony today, yesterday, through the USDA RFID analysis, and through other filings with 3 4 this Court, the USDA has met the standard for withholding under Exemption 4 of the FOIA. 5 Thank you, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Arneson? MR. ARNESON: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 Before I begin, maybe I can help clarify the 9 medical question that you had on Medicare payments. 10 11 I don't have the case in front of me, but in 12 the course of my research in the last few years, I 13 think a couple of years ago what happened was a 14 longstanding injunction in Florida, a District Court 15 in Florida, that had prohibited this Medicare 16 information from being disclosed was lifted. It was lifted, and I'm not going to 17 overstretch myself here, but there had been 18 19 significant pressure, and the Court, I think, finally 20 said, "Enough of this." 21 Then whoever is in charge of Medicare -- is it 22 CMS. They changed their policy. HSH? 23 So that's probably the article that might have 24 come out. So they do not cover that up anymore. it wasn't by Court decision, the Court decision. 25

THE COURT: Okay. Well, and it makes sense 1 2 that it was from Florida, because my recollection of the article was that like the top four or five 3 4 recipients of payments were all from Florida. They were amounts quite higher than anybody else 5 nationwide. 6 7 It's probably not MR. ARNESON: Yes. coincidence that the Court decision was in Florida, 8 but also not that Florida is the highest population --9 10 THE COURT: That's true, too. 11 MR. ARNESON: -- being my age and older. 12 That's one place I can go to feel young. 13 Anyway, I won't -- I don't want to underestimate the value of the basic legal burdens and 14 15 presumptions in this case, but I think the Court has 16 read them enough times, that if she reads them one 17 more time, she'll probably hold it against the person 18 who mentions it. 19 But I do need to touch base and say this is 20 FOIA. Transparency is what it's all about. It's what 21 the Government wants. From the President on down, to 22 the lowest level Federal employee, it is the desired 23 effect. 24 And to that end, exemptions, the nine listed,

of which we're on No. 4, are to be narrowly construed,

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and the requester is always to be given the benefit of the doubt, and essentially to fulfill or achieve the purpose of FOIA.

So that being said, I think my first and foremost concern in this case, and I think it was pretty clear in my inept presentation, was I was trying to establish, and I think we finally did, that despite flow charts and EBTs and all the rest of it, this is, in fact, a Government program.

This is, in fact, a situation, and however you want to cut it, the shorthand version is the Government is paying SNAP retailers, who voluntarily participate in a program to provide food for the people who need it, and those people who are considered to be worthy of our attention because they cannot afford to buy nutritious food for themselves.

THE COURT: So do you concede that the information requested is financial, and it's obtained from a person, so the only issue I have to determine is if it's confidential?

MR. ARNESON: I'd love to say yes, but I have to say that "obtained from a person" makes it -- yes, the original information.

I mean the Government is not going to pay retailers out of the clear blue. I mean they're not

giving out handouts to the retailers. There has to be something that justifies what they're paying out.

I guess my point is, that's not the information we're asking for. Yet there's a reason why the Government is paying it out, but that's what we want to know.

We want to know what is the Government paying, taxpayer dollars, to people voluntarily participating in the program?

The other side of it, through the EBT process is a matter that facilitates the information, yes, that gets to the Government.

But I don't want to confuse the issue by saying it's anything more than what would happen if -- I'll use the example -- Uncle Sam walks into the store with a SNAP recipient and said, "Pick out 12 items, and I'll pay for it." I don't think anybody would be arguing that there the Government is obtaining information, critical information that has anything more than completing the closed circuit.

That information doesn't have any independent existence outside of the functioning of the retailer in the program itself.

It's not the kind of information that you were isolating earlier in your question about people who

1 are maybe wanting to engage in a Government contract. 2 Say the guy who makes helicopters, and he's trying to get the Government contract for that. 3 Let's make it simple. Let's make it the food 4 5 industry. What if people had to bid, bid or somehow get the Government contract, for a certain 6 7 neighborhood to participate in SNAP and it wasn't an open-ended thing? 8 9 Let's just assume that Mr. Ellis is the guy 10 that is going to get the contract for Minnehaha 11 County, and the Government said, "Okay, we're going to 12 give you the contract, but part of the deal here, 13 Mr. Ellis, is we want to know all your future land acquisition intentions." "Okay." He said, "Well, I 14 15 want this contract, so here it is." Now, that's the kind of information clearly 16 that is coming to Government, obtained from a person, 17 18 whether it's through a third party or not, and I grant 19 you that that can be through a third party if it 20 pertains to the person supposedly being injured. 21 But that's a whole different equation. 22 THE COURT: Well, those cases are the ones 23 that I was referencing with Mr. Gaston. 24 MR. ARNESON: Yes. 25 THE COURT: It's normally one person trying

to get a contract. And if the information is 1 2 released, his competitors are able to use that against him in future bidding. 3 4 MR. ARNESON: Quite different from, 5 "Everybody, what are we earning because we decided to participate in the Government program." 6 7 And, frankly, to take the Mr. Ellis example one step further, I'm not quite sure that anybody 8 9 would say, "Okay, Mr. Ellis, you had a contract to 10 provide something to the Government, and we're going 11 to pay you for it," I'm not sure that USDA or any 12 other agency would be saying to us, "The amount that 13 Mr. Ellis is making from the Government is a secret." The information going in about his land 14 15 acquisition intentions perhaps, but I don't think 16 typically if a person enters into a contract with the 17 Government, that what Government pays them is a 18 secret. 19 THE COURT: Because the amount, for 20 instance, if they were successful in the bid 21 competition, whoever got the bid, the amount of that 22 Government contract would be public information. 23 MR. ARNESON: I think it would be. 24 You know, I think the Federal Government 25 doesn't have quite as -- other than FOIA, which is the obvious catch-all.

I mean in South Dakota we have certain categories that information is specifically open or closed, and I have not actually found a statute that said "all Government contracts are open," but I kind of assume that we wouldn't be having this same discussion if that were the case.

Government program participation, voluntary, it just doesn't fit into Exemption 4. Congressional intent, it doesn't match what they designed Exemption 4 to do.

I think the Court hit upon it, because it's not singular. It's not one person against the world or six people against the world.

This is going to apply to 320,000 people equally. I'm not claiming that the effects of having that information available is going to have an equal affect on all of them.

But let's remember that trade associations are not -- and I think it was pretty clear, when we're talking about Walmart being a member of one of the trade associations, I'm pretty sure that Food Market Institute, when they wrote a declaration in favor of concealment in this case, I doubt they were speaking -- if they were speaking for Walmart, I think

everybody would be interested in saying, "Well, Walmart is the one that has been listed in everybody's, the top of everybody's list of the predators."

If Walmart is a member of FMI, and FMI is saying, "Yeah, we don't want disclosure," then that kind of takes the wind out of the sails of the idea that the big, bad guy is going to sit back and twiddle his thumbs.

Plus, I would point out that I didn't see
Walmart responding, commenting to the RFI, saying,
"Yeah." I mean they could have gotten some real
public good out of saying, "For transparency reasons
and for the American taxpayer, who deserves to know
where their money is going, yes, let's have at this
information," and then take advantage of it.

I think the natural instinct of people faced with a prospect or option, if they're given an option of, "Do you want to give me or the world a view of some personal information or something that you consider to be yours, or do you not want to give it," I don't think most of us are looking for a rational reason to give that information. I think our first instinct is to recoil and say, "I'd rather not."

I think that's what we ended up with in the

RFI response. We had, and I'm not stretching here to say hundred of thousands of people who didn't care enough to say, "Yeah, that's a problem for me." We ended up with a few more than 80.

And those people, I think it was clear, weren't necessarily strongly identified with establishing, or even suggesting, let alone proving, the likelihood of substantial competitive harm.

THE COURT: So let me take you in a different direction for a minute.

MR. ARNESON: Sure.

THE COURT: One of the witnesses made a comment about the fact that when retailers signed up for this program, they assumed that the payments to them would be exempt, and that some of those retailers may not have signed up if they knew it was going to be public information.

MR. ARNESON: I think that was Mr. Larkin.

THE COURT: Has there been any thought of making the information public, but, for instance, from this point forward, so retailers would have the option to say, "I don't want to participate if it's going to be public"?

MR. ARNESON: Nobody has approached me with that offer, and I haven't discussed it with my client.

I think, though, that to be -- to try to come up with an honest answer to that right now, I think my approach would be to be consistent with the way I've approached this case the whole time, and that is, "That's unfortunate, but I don't know why my client and why the public, in general, especially with the reason for FOIA in the first place, I don't know why we have to suffer if the Government made a mistake with these people."

I don't mean to be too harsh about that, but that really, you know, "We're sorry that it happened that way, but if you don't want to continue, you can get out," that doesn't really fall in, I don't think, to Exemption 4, anyway, because I think Exemption 4 is under the standard of likelihood or likely to cause substantial competitive harm to those supplying the information.

That begins with the inquiry: Is there competition? In this case I think it was all agreed from the beginning, well, I don't know how much competition there is for SNAP people, in particular.

I agree with the experts and with the people in the field. Grocery business is very competitive. But that means that the harm has to be coming from the competition.

What you're suggesting is a harm that potentially is coming from the fact that they were told by an Agency that their information wasn't going to be disclosed, and now it is. So I don't even see that in the equation.

However, I'm not saying that I'm going to be so close-minded as to say, if somebody came with some sort of legitimate suggestion, that we wouldn't take it under advisement.

But I think getting back to whether this is even an Exemption 4 case, I think it's a very legitimate issue that we bring up, because the case law, and I think Stephanie and I probably are both sick of looking at it, it keeps — it doesn't answer that question, because it's not, I don't think, it's not something that ever would have ever really deserved to be in the Court system. I don't think this is an Exemption 4 case for participating in a Government program.

Now, assuming I have to deal with Exemption 4, and I will answer your question, yes, we have no -- I mean we can't exactly argue this isn't financial or business information.

But the "obtained from a person" does continue to bother me, because I don't think -- I mean I think

that necessarily goes back to are we talking with a closed circuit? Are we talking an open circuit of the information?

Again, using the Ellis example, that's the kind of information that I think Congress was intending -- or the Courts that imposed this. I mean this, as we all know, is case law, case law standard.

I think "obtained from a person" came about in a context that was not the back half of a Government program or a Government contract. I think it was intended to be something -- well, I guess it was intended to be something like the Ellis example, where he has to divulge specific information about himself to be doing something that all the rest of the world is not involved in.

But, anyway, I don't want to belabor the "obtained from a person," because I think I tend then to get back to using that same -- that same argument sort of predominates in the very first argument that I'm making, that this isn't an Exemption 4 case.

So I think, yes, we can jump down to the substantial competitive harm issue. That would be logically the most significant appearing legal standard that we have to deal with.

What I would say about it is this. I don't

want to minimize what was presented here on behalf of the Government. I also don't want to minimize what the Argus Leader is saying. I think both of them intended to present an accurate reflection of what concerned them.

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But I never once really got beyond the point, with the Government's evidence, that, yes, there are people who worry about competition. There are people who worry -- and that's a logical thing for a businessman. I mean competition has got to be the No. 1 concern.

We also heard from the same people that competition is good for America.

I would love to tell this Court that this case could be decided simply on the fact that competition is good for the SNAP Program, which I think it is, because I think competition, if it does lead to lower prices, is going to lead to greater buying power by the SNAP recipients.

But that isn't yet the standard. We have to deal with the likelihood of substantial competitive harm.

I have not yet seen a definition of "likely" or "substantial" in a Court decision that is any more helpful than the definitions I've been using

personally throughout my analysis, weak as that has been, from Merriam-Webster. Nobody has dissuaded me from believing those are legitimate.

I don't think I need to tell the Court what those words mean. It's not simply creating a prospect. It's going way beyond that. "Likely" and "substantial." I mean that's defined to be highly probably that there's going to be significant harm.

Well, I guess I should go straight to my definitions. I put them in my pretrial submission.

"Likely" is defined as "having a high probability of occurring or being true; very probable." This is the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition, 1993, another thing that dates me. You don't even want to know how old my Black's Law Dictionary is.

"Substantial" is defined as "considerable in quantity; significantly great." That's a pretty high standard.

What I heard throughout the last couple of days, and actually quite longer than that, is we're worried about competition. This is information that will probably be used, but it was never really well established how effectively it will be used.

Nobody on our end of it -- I mean Dr. Volpe is

saying, "I think it's a flexible enough concept that it could be somewhat detrimental; it could be somewhat beneficial."

But I don't think there's a definitive answer that this is likely to cause substantial competitive harm, and I think if that were logical, I think the Government would have come to that conclusion a long time ago and dispensed with the RFI. I don't know that they needed to go through the RFI. I guess they can dispute that.

But I think the two documents that they used, their own regulation and the executive order, both clearly identify that if you believe in this defense, you don't have to do this Notice stuff.

So I'm not really sure why they did, unless it was not intuitively obvious to them that they had a good defense. I don't blame them for wanting to get more expertise, but it seems somewhat indicative that if a party is uncertain, that might reflect upon the logic of the conclusion.

And I've always thought it was an illogical conclusion. I'm not so sure that USDA didn't have some doubts about the logic of the conclusion, too, that the release of this information was going to cause the substantial competitive harm, or was likely

to, that was necessary to reach that standard.

So when they went to the retailers, what did they come back with? Yes, they came back with some people have had legitimate concerns.

But the most focused of them all, in my impression, and I think Mr. Hays was very well intentioned and congenial and all of that.

But I think obviously, and the way the Government must have agreed with me, in the use of Gwen Forman, and she's speaking for her own store based on her knowledge of her own information, and then extrapolating or suggesting that somebody else will be able to do the same.

Well, yes, I understand that Ms. Forman, or anybody in her position, who owns stores or a store can identify what their SNAP sales are and compare it to their overall sales and find a correlation. But how that generates to the point of being helpful or harmful in the big picture, it's pretty nebulous.

I'm not saying that it might not add to their competition from whatever that outfit was that she was -- Quik Mart, or something like that.

But nobody also said to Cumberland, "Okay, if that's your strategy, to pull back and stay there for a while, because you just closed out in four states."

Nobody is forcing them to take that approach.

I think she did say that if they decided to change tomorrow, a different approach, and they saw the opportunities, they've got the same access to the same information.

So the other thing that I was missing from the testimony was there must be a great, to quote all of our favorite President, "the silent majority." Maybe that was Agnew. I don't know.

I never quite got a sense of who was going to be targeted, and what levels they were looking for, and what was going to be too low to be interesting, perhaps too high to be interesting. Nobody actually established, through testimony, what exactly they were expecting to find or would be their line of demarcation if they got this information.

My impression is that's because of the 300,000, I don't know, roughly let's just say 300,000, maybe it's 280,000 now in the SNAP Program, that when these numbers come out, if they were to, maybe 275,000 of them, you don't even blink. You say, "Well, that seems pretty normal."

Maybe the 500 that are really, really over the top, maybe they are all trafficking. I think we all have seen enough media reports of that issue to know

that there obviously is a great middle-of-the-road group out there that isn't going to be impacted at all one way or the other. I mean nobody is going to target them, I mean even if targeting were the objective here.

Again, I'm not suggesting that just because somebody has got good sales volume for SNAP, that they are going to become prey for the predators. That could be exactly the opposite of what happens.

Quite honestly, that assumes they have no defenses to fight back. That assumes that these people who come in and prey upon them are going to know exactly what they are doing and how to do it and are going to be successful.

Who knows? They may just have totally screwed it up, and they may say, "Whoa, they are really good at what they do. We probably want to regroup here, and, yeah, their SNAP sales are really good. We're not going to take enough to stick around."

That's possible. And I have not heard enough to convince me about this being the substantial competitive harm, again, significantly great competitive harm being likely.

The only numbers I've really heard, and I did finally hear I think from the last witness who -- and

I'm not going to object, but I think he did more than rebut, but that's fine. I want the truth to come out, and if people have opinions, let's hear them.

I think the range of SNAP volume that he was talking about went from probably zero, because there are four stores that don't have any SNAP, up to I think he said as high as 50.

But what really surprised me and I think got my attention was Miss Forman, and I know this is not information that probably needs to leave this courtroom, but she gave some SNAP data that I thought was shockingly low, an average of I believe 1.5 percent of total store sales.

MR. GASTON: Objection.

MR. ARNESON: If you want me not to mention this, I will.

MR. GASTON: I would prefer, sir. It's not a closed courtroom anymore.

MR. ARNESON: Okay. A very low number, a very low percentage, I thought, relative to the potential harm.

I guess most of the harm, I know that there was some extraneous or tangential harms that were suggested, and it might not all be SNAP business people are after, but the basic idea, I think, was

that the good SNAP volume is going to cause other people in the SNAP Program, or not in the SNAP Program, to get into the SNAP Program, move in and try to take that stuff away.

I guess Cumberland, which has every one of its stores in the program, and I think seems to be a pretty successful operation. I mean I've actually been in the Northeast, and they've got some nice looking stores.

THE COURT: I think she said there were like four stores that are not in SNAP.

MR. ARNESON: Okay. That's right. They were the kiosks. Yes.

It just strikes me that that's a fairly small amount of business to, first of all, go after, make huge plans over, and I'm not saying that's the exact percentage for all stores. But I think we would need to know a lot more about what those percentages are before we start saying, "Oh, my goodness."

And I don't remember if anybody tried to come up with an overall across-the-nation percentage, but all the numbers I heard were pretty low. That means we're generally talking about going after a very small segment of that store's sales, in the first place.

I know there's this low margin in the grocery

business, but this really minimizes the impact,
I think.

So I know that this is supposed to be short, and I know that I wasn't even interested in talking.

But I think it's really critical that we keep in mind what this, first of all, what kind of case this is, that it is a voluntary participation in a Government program.

For that reason, I think, as the Court is aware, I did offer in my pretrial submission the prospect that no -- case law doesn't get developed unless Judges think there's a good reason for it.

Otherwise, it's stare decisis, precedent, whatever.

But there's a lot of good case law that has been developed, because at some point along the line somebody said, "This set of facts makes sense to create something important here," and I think this is that case.

And when it comes to Exemption 4 analysis of cases that are in this context, which is a Government program, somebody voluntarily participating, and the information being requested is nothing more than what they get out of that program, nothing really other than that, quid pro quo, I think the Court, and I'm asking this Court to take it under advisement, at

least, should consider there should be a fourth prong to the Exemption 4 test.

In my view, this is one aspect of the Exemption 4 test. But this particular Exemption 4 test should not only have to be commercial/financial; obtained from a person; likely to cause substantial competitive harm; but if it is likely to cause substantial competitive harm, if that's a "yes," we should still have to balance that against the benefits, potential benefits to the public and the program itself.

The key here from Day 1, and it's what got me confused in the first place and probably forced me into going up to St. Paul, and my fault for not being better versed for this Court at that time.

But what I cannot wrap my head around then, and I still can't, is why the recipients of the SNAP Program are not priority here. Quite honestly, this distracts us from that mission.

And by not taking into consideration the benefit, the competitive harm, even if that's a given, that that could do for the program by perhaps expanding competition, getting more retailers who are not prohibited. Remember, there's an almost free entry into the retailer program. The more

competition, generally the better.

Yes, there are going to be some that don't survive, and, yes, there may be some areas that might suffer for the competition driving other competition out.

The big picture, I think we heard here once, twice, maybe three times, from not my witnesses, but from their witnesses, competition is good for America. If competition is good for America, competition is good for SNAP.

For that reason, I would ask the Court to seriously consider, is this an Exemption 4 case, to begin with? If it is, is there really a likelihood of substantial competitive harm? And if that is answered even "yes," take that last step.

Now, I have one final --

THE COURT: Let me go back to the language of Exemption 4, which says that it has to be information obtained from a person.

So I look at Exhibit 201-A where the witness added in the "Government bank" box underneath the EBT processor, with an arrow going from the Government bank up to the EBT processor.

I think there was also testimony that money was transferred from the Government bank to the EBT

1 processor's bank. 2 So information went from the Government to the EBT processor and to the EBT processor's bank, 3 4 indicating that money was transferred on behalf of a 5 retailer vendor number, based on things that had been 6 approved. 7 If the information that you are requesting are the yearly redemption amounts paid to each 8 9 participating store, isn't that information generated 10 by the Government and transferred out, rather than 11 obtained from a person? 12 MR. ARNESON: Well, I agree with that, and I 13 know that's what the Eighth Circuit said for the 14 purpose of making its decision. But I also understand 15 the Government's -- the USDA's point of view. Yes, I'm asking for what the Government is 16 17 paying. I'm not asking for what's been obtained. But 18 I do realize their argument was at some point they can 19 create an origin of information that doesn't have to 20 be directly from the SNAP retailer. 21 Now, the fact that it gets into the Government 22 at some point in the chain before the final --23 THE COURT: Matt is trying to do whatever. 24 There. MR. ARNESON: I had put my exhibit in the 25

car, so I wasn't really clued in.

2.1

I guess I understand that "obtained from a person" is a fairly liberal concept. I never thought it applied, because I didn't think we were asking for that information. I thought we were asking for the other side of the transaction. But I understood that --

THE COURT: Well, it kind of goes back to the argument of when a person bids on a project, and all of the bid information, the information they submit is confidential, and it may impact or cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person bidding, but the actual amount of the award doesn't fall under an exemption. It would be similar to that argument.

MR. ARNESON: Well, that's what I'm -- yes.

It's circuitous. I would agree that whether you

consider it to be payment or redemption, that's why it

gets confusing conceptually.

I agree that either way, it's not secret information. I would agree that it's payment information. It's just the process that facilitates the payment.

As I said, if it had been you walk into the grocery store, you take what you want, and then the

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store owner said -- bills Government, sends them a
 1
 2
      bill. "Yes, Joe, the recipient, came in and took some
      bread. You owe me 35 cents." And the Government paid
 3
 4
       it.
 5
                     I don't think the bill of the 35
       cents -- well, yeah, it's obtained from Joe, but it's
 6
 7
       really nothing more than the amount he wants to be
      paid.
 8
 9
               That's why when -- yes. I've seen language
10
       that when it's suggesting that the amount that a
11
      person is being paid is dependent upon the
12
       transmission of some ingoing information. I'm saying,
13
       yeah, but it's just what you have to do to be paid
14
      under the system.
15
               I mean it's just as if -- Judge, you provide a
16
       service to the United States, and you get paid for it.
       And I don't think anybody --
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18
                 THE COURT: And it's public. My salary is
19
      public.
20
                 MR. ARNESON: Yes. And I think most of
21
       their salaries are public, too.
22
                 THE COURT: I think they are.
23
       Government employees are.
24
                 MR. ARNESON: And if I had any, I would let
25
       you know it, but I don't. Probably after this case, I
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probably won't.
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              So I don't have anything more. If you have
 3
       more questions of me.
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                THE COURT: No. Thank you, Mr. Arneson.
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                 MR. ARNESON: Thank you.
                THE COURT: Mr. Gaston, did you have any
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 7
       rebuttal?
                MS. BENGFORD: Just a few cases regarding
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 9
       the -- well, I should let Mr. Gaston speak. Sorry.
                 MR. GASTON: Okay. Your Honor, may I stay
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11
       seated, or would you like me to approach the podium?
12
                 THE COURT: Either way.
13
                MR. GASTON: I will stay here, if it suits
14
       the Court.
15
              Your Honor, first you asked if information of
16
       this sort was kept before. We do have a case on
17
      point. We look -- pardon?
              Oh. Your Honor, I was sort of trying to
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19
       resuscitate argument earlier that I was not completely
20
       informed on, and I focused on that.
               I think Your Honor is most interested in the
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22
       "from a person" component. Is that correct?
23
                 THE COURT: Both that and the confidential
24
       component.
25
                MR. GASTON: Right. I see.
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So information contained in a Government generated report is obtained from a person if such information came from a nongovernmental source.

2.1

There's been a lot of discussion about the EBT system, and if I might offer the Court a short example of how the system works and what's being sought, maybe I could help clarify this system altogether.

I'm discussing High Country Citizens Alliance v. Clarke. It is 2005 WL 2453955. At the time of the drafting of this particular document, it was unreported. It was citing Public Citizen Health Research v. National Institutes of Health, which is 209 F.Supp.2d 37.

So, yes, the Government believes this information, indeed, comes from a person. Yes.

Then the second part is that some rates and reformulations information, supplied by a source outside the Government, fall within protections of Exemption 4. The case that we support that with is Public Citizen Health Research Group,
209 F.Supp.2d 44, and it cites Judicial Watch,
108 F.Supp.2d 28.

Here the language we quoted was, "Bank obtained information from the insurance applicants themselves, commercial lenders for the applicant, or a

purchaser of the goods at issue. Each of these entities is a person within the meaning of Exemption 4."

So, Your Honor, what I believe and what the Government believes is that when it's information that comes from the retailer and it goes to the EBT processor, this is a singular transaction that does not speak towards Government spending at all.

What it speaks towards is this data recording, the EBT processor. If you cut the Government out of the entire chain, the information would still flow from the retailer to the EBT processor. The EBT processor then provides an accounting to FNS.

If I might use an example, Your Honor. It's much like if you bought dinner for a friend, and when you got the receipt, you get two receipts inside the black envelope.

One is the one you sign. That executes the transaction. That tells your bank to pay the vendor.

The second one is one that you don't sign.

You keep for your notes. Maybe you put it in your

personal Quicken. Maybe you keep it in your pocket.

Maybe you throw it away.

We keep it, and we use it to help enforce and manage the program. That second receipt is what FNS

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has, and that, Your Honor, is what is in the STARS
 1
 2
       System. There is no record of actual payment.
                 THE COURT: Yes, but the Government document
 3
 4
       would be my credit card company paying the other
 5
       entity. That's my record. It's not the retailer or
 6
       the grocery store's record. That's my record.
 7
                              I'm sorry. Reverting back to
                MR. GASTON:
       the retailer analysis that we're looking at on the
 8
 9
      page?
10
                 THE COURT: I'm reverting back to the
11
       Government bank putting money in to pay the EBT
12
      processor.
13
                MR. GASTON: That's -- and the chart shows
14
       that. The Government does pay the EBT processor.
15
       But --
16
                 THE COURT: And I'm saying that is the
      Government record. It's not a record of a person.
17
18
                 MR. GASTON: It is a Government -- okay,
19
       yes. The money from the Treasury, going to the EBT
20
      processor, that is a Government record.
21
                 THE COURT: Right.
22
                MR. GASTON: That's not the records --
23
                 THE COURT: So then that's what I'm asking.
24
      Does that fall under Exemption 4? It was not obtained
25
       from a person. It's a record obtained from a
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Government entity.

MR. GASTON: Those particular records, first, those aren't USDA records, so I can't speak to them directly.

They do discuss payment, and, in fact, payment information for SNAP, and this is sometimes ignored or forgotten by counsel, is that this information does go out. We do put it for the total volume of the program. We do it by state. We do it by zip code. We even do it by county.

The only thing that holds us doing it on the actual individual granular level is our belief that the law prohibits it under competitive harm.

We are trying to follow the law, Your Honor. That is the core of this case.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that. I'm trying to figure out exactly how the law fits in with this transaction and whether Exemption 4 actually applies, if it's a Government record, rather than something that's obtained from a person.

MR. GASTON: I would like to delineate that the information that is being requested in this particular matter is information that's kept -- and I can find the actual FOIA Request. But it's kept in the 2005, 2010 annual redemption data in the STARS

System. Right?

That is an aggregation and a manipulation of data received from the EBT processor. That is information that comes from the EBT processor to the USDA, which is aggregated by that EBT processor from data received on a daily basis from retailers.

That's the entire flow. The payment part, we have nothing to do with.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else anybody wanted to add?

MR. ARNESON: One thing, and I forgot to, Your Honor.

I think, first of all, what's being described here is the Government knows, within its recesses, there is a record which has been acknowledged and admitted in this case throughout, that records, keeps track of the amounts that SNAP retailers get from the Government for their participation. I mean that's clear.

And how we want to recast it because it goes through a process, EBTs and credit cards, this bank, that bank, and the other bank, it does not diminish the fact that it is, in fact, what the Court is identifying it to be, a Government payment and a record of a Government payment.

The Government has to keep a record of those payments. It's absurd to think that they don't.

The other thing I have, Your Honor, and I almost hesitate to bring it up, and it's a sensitive matter, because I'm hoping this Court will make a decision based without limiting itself to the 2005 to 2010 information, and might see fit to issue a ruling that could have bearing on past, present, future.

But if the Court were to go against us on that issue, I do believe we have to take into very serious consideration what value, and God knows, I don't think in 2011 I thought I would still be here in 2016 litigating this case, but what value 2005 to 2010 SNAP redemption information or SNAP payment information, however you want to phrase it, what value that could possibly have to people making plans in 2016.

I think there is case law that has been cited in pretrial submissions and elsewhere that suggest that worst case scenario, and we are not --

MR. GASTON: Objection, Your Honor. Outside the evidence.

THE COURT: I think I can apply my common sense. So the objection is overruled. You may go ahead.

1 MR. ARNESON: Okay. I didn't mean to stray 2 outside the evidence. THE COURT: Well, he's arguing there wasn't 3 any evidence that the value of 2005 to 2010 data would 4 5 be minimal at this point. MR. ARNESON: Oh, there was no evidence. 6 7 THE COURT: And I said I can apply my common sense. So go ahead with your argument. 8 9 MR. ARNESON: Yes. I think you can apply 10 your common sense, and I think the case law suggests 11 we don't have to prove that six years have passed. I 12 think there are plenty of cases that talk about stale 13 information. Heaven knows, I think in this highly 14 15 competitive field, making changes everyday that we 16 heard about for the last two days, 2010, 2005, 2007 material probably is not going to be dispositive in 17 18 making decisions for 2016. 19 That's all I wanted to get across. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: So did either side want to 21 supplement your closings with written briefs, or do 22 you want me to rely on your pretrial submissions and 23 the summary judgment motions? 24 MR. ARNESON: I'm comfortable, Your Honor, 25 without. I don't want to write another word on this,

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but I will.
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 2
                 MR. GASTON: A moment, Your Honor.
                 MS. BENGFORD: Your Honor, I do think we
 3
       will brief at least the "from a person" issue for the
 4
       Court.
 5
 6
                 THE COURT: All right. How much time do you
 7
       think you would need?
 8
                 MS. BENGFORD: Would 21 days be okay,
 9
      Your Honor?
                 THE COURT: Sure, 21 days. Do you want to
10
11
       respond?
12
                 MR. ARNESON: Yes. I'll reserve the right
13
       to respond.
14
                 THE COURT: 21 days.
15
                MR. ARNESON: Are we limiting it to that
16
       issue then?
                 THE COURT: I think that's all they wanted
17
       to brief. Do you want to brief more than that?
18
19
                 MR. ARNESON: I don't.
20
                 THE COURT: I'll give you 21 days to
21
       respond, and then five days for a reply.
22
               Anything else anybody wanted to bring up
23
       today?
                MR. ARNESON: No. Thank you for the Court's
24
25
       indulgence.
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MR. GASTON: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: Thank you. I'll get an opinion
       out as soon as I get your briefs in. We'll be
 3
       adjourned.
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                (End of proceedings at 4:20 p.m.)
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA :SS CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 2 SOUTHERN DIVISION 3 I, Jill M. Connelly, Official United States 4 District Court Reporter, Registered Merit Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter, and Notary Public, hereby certify that the above and foregoing transcript is the 5 true, full, and complete transcript of the 6 above-entitled case, consisting of Pages 1 - 52. I further certify that I am not a relative or 7 employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties hereto, nor a relative or employee of such attorney or 8 counsel, nor do I have any interest in the outcome or 9 events of the action. IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereto set my 10 hand this 27th day of June, 2016. 11 /s/ Jill M. Connelly 12 13 Jill M. Connelly, RMR, CRR Court Reporter 14 United States Courthouse 15 400 S. Phillips Avenue Sioux Falls, SD 57104 Phone: (605) 330-6669 16 E-mail: Jill Connelly@sdd.uscourts.gov 17 18 19 20 2.1 22 23 24 25

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